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Abstract 
Using a unique dataset which provides information on the financial structure of start-up companies in 
the Chinese manufacturing industry, this paper documents robust evidence that access to formal 
financing channels has beneficial effects on firm size, these effects being more marked as we move up 
the entry size distribution. By contrast we find negative relationships between informal finance and 
entry size across all size quantiles. Given the well-documented positive correlations between firm size 
and numerous performance indicators, this paper has therefore uncovered entry size as an additional 
channel through which financial development promotes growth. 
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6.  Conclusions Non-Technical Summary  
New firms play a significant role in industry dynamics by creating a large number of jobs, introducing 
innovative production techniques and providing competitive stimulus to market incumbents. The literature 
shows that while there is a particularly robust positive correlation between start-up size and firm 
performance, financial constraints hamper firms from reaching their optimal size in the earlier stage of 
their life cycle. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of various financing channels - formal 
channels such as bank loans, foreign finance, state finance, and informal financing sources (i.e. self 
raised finance) - in determining the size of start-up companies in China. We draw on a large and recent 
dataset that uniquely provides information on the financial structure of start-ups, and employ quantile 
regression technique to trace out the differential effects of finance across the entire start-up size 
distribution. To our knowledge this is the first study of its kind.  
The paper documents robust evidence that access to formal financing channels has beneficial effects on 
firm size, these effects being more marked as we move up the entry size distribution. By contrast, we find 
negative relationships between informal finance and entry size across all size quantiles. Given the well-
documented positive correlations between firm size and numerous performance indicators (e.g. 
productivity, exporting and survival), this paper has therefore uncovered entry size as an additional 
channel through which financial development promotes growth. The finding has relevance to the vibrant 
literature on finance and growth, especially to the strand of the literature that seeks to document the 
distributional effects of financial development. This work has also an important policy implication. Given 
the relationship between firm size and performance, the extent to which Chinese start-up companies will 
create longer lasting jobs as well as significantly contribute to aggregate  productivity growth is directly 
related to their access to the state-dominated banking system. In this sense, our paper has highlighted the 
potential benefits of more tightly coordinating the on-going reforms of the Chinese financial system with 
existing industrial development strategies 
 
 1.  Introduction 
It is now well-understood in the economic literature that new firms play a 
significant role in industry dynamics by creating a large number of jobs, introducing 
innovative production techniques and providing competitive stimulus to market 
incumbents (e.g. Geroski, 1991 and Caves, 1998). The literature also shows that while 
there is a particularly robust positive correlation between start-up size and firm 
performance (e.g. Mata and Portugal 1995), financial constraints hamper firms from 
reaching their optimal size in the earlier stage of their life cycle (Cabral and Mata, 2003).   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of various financing channels - 
formal channels such as bank loans, foreign finance, state finance, and informal financing 
sources (i.e. self raised finance) - in determining the size of start-up companies in China. 
We draw on a large and recent dataset that uniquely provides information on the 
financial structure of start-ups, and employ quantile regression technique (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978) to trace out the differential effects of finance across the entire start-up size 
distribution. To our knowledge this is the first study of its kind.  
This work fits into the recent debate in the growth and finance literature on the 
relative contribution of formal and informal financing channels to China’s phenomenal 
growth experience over recent years (e.g. Allen et al., 2005). It is also relevant to the 
wider debate on the role of informal financial arrangements in a country’s economic 
growth (Stiglitz, 1990 and Arott and Stiglitz 1990). Moreover, our study contributes to 
the body of work on the distributional effects of financial development which suggests 
that firms at the lower end of the size distribution benefits disproportionately from 
financial development (Beck et al 2005), but also that bigger firms are more likely to 
depend on long-term financing and larger loans for their development (Beck, et al 2007).  
  1A survey conducted in 2002 shows that self-raised finance was the major 
financing source of Chinese start-up firms
1 (Garcia-Fontes 2005). According the World 
Bank Investment Climate Survey for China, not only start-ups but also more generally 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) face important credit constraints even compared 
to other Asian countries (Dollar et al 2003). In spite of the financial constraints, SMEs in 
China account for 40% of the total industrial outputs and nearly 30 % of total profit in 
2005
2. It is therefore one of the objectives of this paper to inform the policy debate on 
the role financial policy should have in fostering industry dynamics through the entry of 
strong and competitive firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by giving an 
overview of firms’ financing pattern in China. Section 3 explains the econometric 
methodology and Section 4 discusses the dataset used in the analysis. The main findings 
of the paper are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Firms’ financing pattern in China 
China’s formal financial system is dominated by four large state-owned commercial 
banks that enjoy around 70% market share in terms of both savings and loans during 
1995-2002 (Du, 2006). These banks used to carry policy-related functions which partially 
explain the soft-budget constraint phenomenon (Lin et al, 1998). China’s capital market 
                                           
1 The survey was conducted by the Project Group of Research in Chinese Private Enterprises organized by 
China industrial and Commercial Union and Research Commission of Chinese Private Business in 2002. 
The start-ups were found to be financed mainly by self-accumulated money, private borrowings and Rural 
Credit Corporations. 
2 Data Source: China Statistical Year Book 2006. This is according to the small firm definition of the 
National Statistical Bureau of Statistics. For manufacturing industrial firms, small firms are below 300 
employees, 3,000,000 RMByuan total sales, and 4,000,000 RMByuan total assets; big firms are above 2,000 
employees, 30,000,000 RMByuan total sales, and 40,000,000 RMByuan total assets; medium firms are 
between the two sets of figures.  
  2is rather small by international standard
3 (Allen et al., 2005), the two stock exchange 
markets were established in the early 1990s, and by 2004 only 1,337 companies were 
listed in the two markets. The stock market is therefore not a relevant channel of 
finance for the majority of domestic firms.  
The majority of Chinese firms are typically financed from a mixture of bank 
loans (debt) and equity finance from state budget, self-raised financing channels and 
foreign investment. Domestic bank loans are borrowings from domestic banks and non-
bank financial institutions. According to our calculations, the role of bank loans in 
financing firms has declined over time.  In 1998, 50% of firms had bank loans and this 
figure has decreased to 25% in 2005. During the same period, the average share of bank 
loans in total capital has dropped from 22% to 9%, suggesting increased availability of 
alternative financing sources. 
State budget appropriations refer to the appropriations in the budget of the 
central and local governments earmarked for capital investment. This type of financial 
allocation has diminished gradually.  For example, the average proportion of firms 
getting state budgets has dropped from 33% in 1998 to 6% in 2005; and the average 
percentage of state budget in firms’ capital has declined from 21% to 3% over the same 
period (Du and Girma, 2008).  
The third and important source of finance for many firms is self-raised finance. 
This includes firms’ finance from capital markets, bonds issued by individual enterprises, 
individual borrowing and funds channelled through local governments or collectives. 
This is similar to what is referred to as informal finance in Maksimovic et al (2008). 
                                           
3 As Allen et al (2005) show, China’s total value traded over GDP is only 0.11 while the LLSV-sample 
average (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998) is 0.27; its market capitalization over GDP is 
0.32 while the sample average is 0.47. 
  3Informal financial sectors are comprised of savers, lenders and borrowers that can be 
individuals, firms or associations that act as financial intermediaries but not regulated by 
authorities. One of the striking characteristics of the informal financial sector is the 
importance of personal relationships (Germidies, Kessler and Meghir, 1991; Allen et al., 
2005). 
The fourth source of firm finance is foreign investment and it refers to the 
finance invested as equity capital by foreign investors and funds borrowed from foreign 
sources and managed by domestic enterprises.  It has been argued that the large amount 
of foreign direct investment in China is an indicator of indigenous private sector firms’ 
financial constraints (Huang, 2003).  
Du and Girma (2007, 2008) document the details of the financial sectors in China 
and the financing channels of the Chinese manufacturing firms, in which they report 
that during 1998-2005, finance from state budgets, domestic bank loans, self-raised 
finance and foreign investment accounted for 9.59%, 14.28%, 62.35%, and 13.79% of 
firms’ total finance respectively.  
3.  Empirical methodology  
To assess the impact of financing sources on firms’ start-up size, the following reduced 
form equation is specified: 
                  1 ' it it jt it it Size FIN IND D β γδ − ′′ =+ + ε +                            (1) 
where SIZE is entry size for start-up firm i at time t measured by log of employment, 
FIN is a vector of financing source variables: state finance, domestic banks loans, self-
raised finance and foreign finance. D is a set of time dummies and industry dummies and 
ε is the error term. The vector IND consists of a set of lagged three-digit industry 
  4(denoted by industry j) characteristics that are found to determine start-up size in the 
literature (e.g. Geroski, 1995; Mata and Machado, 1996 and Görg and Strobl 2001). These 
industry characteristics include minimum efficient scale (MES), turbulence (TURB), the 
growth (INDG), foreign penetration (FDI) and concentration (HERF).  MES is measured 
as the log of median industry employment size as suggested by Sutton (1991). It seems 
reasonable to assume that, the higher MES in an industry, the larger, on average, will be 
new start-ups in order to be able to compete effectively in the market. We would, hence, 
expect a positive relationship between the size of entrants and the MES. TURB is 
measured as the sum of employment shares in firms that have entered or exited the 
industry from t-1 to t as suggested by Beesley and Hamilton (1984). Large scale 
simultaneous entry and exit in an industry can be taken as evidence of low sunk costs.  
Assuming that entrants are risk averse, one may expect that, the lower are sunk costs, 
the higher will be the start-up size of new entrants as the losses associated with a possible 
failure are lower.  INDG is measured by industry sales growth rates. In a fast growing 
industry, the probability of a plant surviving is higher than in a slow growing industry 
as incumbents may be less likely to retaliate in a fast growing market.  This implies that 
entrants may choose to enter at a larger size in fast growing markets, due to the higher 
probability of survival.  HERF is measured as the Herfindahl index,  calculated in terms 
of market shares, and existing evidence shows that positive relationship exists between 
industry concentration and entry size (Holmes and Stevens, 2002).  Finally, FDI is 
defined as the proportion of industry sales accounted by foreign multinational 
companies. Görg and Strobl (2001) provide evidence that a high presence of 
multinationals in an industry leads to a reduction in plant start-up size, due to 
competition effects.   
  5A natural way of analysing the differential effects of finance across the firm size 
distribution is by deploying quantile regression technique (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). 
Denoting the vector of regressors in Equation (1) by Z, the quantile regression model 
can be written as 
( ) θ θ θ θ β ε β it it it it it it Z Z SIZE Quant Z SIZE ′ = + ′ = | ,                                  (2) 
where  ( it it Z SIZE Quant | ) Δ θ   denotes the conditional quantile of SIZE.  The 
distribution of the error term  θ ε  is  left unspecified, so the estimation method is 
semiparametric.  At the θ
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where N is the sample size. 
Thus by increasing θ from 0 to 1, one can trace the effects of finance on the 
entire distribution of firm size, conditional on the set of control variables. Thus, quantile 
regressions allow us to focus attention on specific parts of the SIZE distribution, and 
identify where in this distribution finance exerts the greatest or the least significant 
impact.  
 
4.   Database description    
Our econometric analysis draws on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB).  It is estimated 
that the firms contained in the data set account for about 85-90% of total output in most 
industries. The NSB performs several logic tests to ensure the accuracy of the 
information in the report and identify illogical data. The data set includes variables such 
  6as ownership structure, financing sources industry affiliation, establishment year, 
employment, gross output, value-added. 
  The dataset used in this paper spans the period 1999 to 2005, and comprises more 
than 1.3 million firm-year observations. It is worth noting that we used the whole 
sample to construct industry-level variables (e.g. industry entry and exit rates). However, 
in view of the objective of this paper, the econometric work is confined to the 
indigenous start-up companies. Since our empirical model controls for pre-entry (lagged) 
industry characteristics, we focus on start-up firms between 2000 and 2005. A firm is 
defined to be a new entrant at time t if its establishment year is given as time t and it is 
observed in the database for the first time at time t. This tight definition helps avoid 
measurement error problems in the establishment year variable. A nice feature of the 
database is that it maintains a unique enterprise identifier irrespective of the dynamics of 
ownership change, so we will be able to distinguish between genuine new entrants and 
exiting firms operating under a new ownership structure.  
  We identified 91578 start-ups over the period 2000-2005 that have the necessary 
information for the econometric estimation. Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of 
the entrants by year and by technology intensity of their industry (see Appendix A for 
the definition of technology intensity). Figure 1 shows histograms of start-up size for 
2000 and 2005, and Table 2 gives some summary statistics of variables used in the 
empirical analysis. 
5. Empirical Findings 
Table 3 reports the quantiles regression estimates. Starting with the industry level 
control variables, it is interesting to observe that generally these variables have the 
  7expected signs as discussed in Section 3. However, we also observe some interesting 
heterogeneity across the size distribution. For example, industry level FDI does not 
exert any effects on the entry size of firms at the top end of the distribution, whereas it 
has negative ramifications elsewhere in the distribution.  
Turning our attention to the impact of the financing channels, we uncover 
evidence that self-raised finance has deleterious effects on entry size, this negative impact 
being more pronounced at the upper end of the size distribution. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that larger firms are more likely to depend on formal 
financing and larger bank loans for their development. This finding is reinforced by the 
results of positive relationship between entry size and access to formal financing 
channels (bank loans, foreign investment and in come cases state budget). As Table 3 and 
Figure 2 show, the relationship between bank loans and entry size gets stronger as we 
move up the entry size distribution. To the extent that firm size and performance are 
correlated, our econometric results suggest that financial development is likely to foster 
growth through its positive effects on entry size. This is an important finding which has 
not been previously documented in the finance and growth literature (e.g. Levine, 2005).   
The quantile regressions estimates also show that start-ups that enjoy foreign 
finance and state finance tend to be bigger than otherwise equivalent firms. It is a stylised 
fact that new entrants are exposed to high risk of exit, especially in the first post-entry 
years. As Geroski (1995) put it, “the most palpable consequence of entry is exit”. 
Influential theoretical models such as Javanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) 
predict that firms’ decision to expand in size depends on their expectation about their 
efficiency and the uncertainty associated with this expectation. In light of this 
  8observation, it appears that bank loans, foreign and state finance have positive 
ramifications on entry size by reducing the firms’ uncertainty regarding the future.  
In an influential paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) advanced the idea that different 
industrial sectors are likely to face different external financing requirements due to their 
technological differences, and for this reason the impact of financial development is 
likely to be different across different sectors. We explore the extent to which this idea 
applies in the context of the effect of finance on start-up size in China by re-estimating 
our model on each of the four sub-samples defined by the industries’ level of technology 
intensity
4.  Tables 4-7 report the results from this experiment. In general, our conclusion 
that formal financing channels have positive effects on entry size, while firms that rely 
disproportionately on informal finance enter the market with a relatively small size, 
holds across all sectors. There are, however, some noteworthy industry heterogeneities. 
Firstly, the impact of bank loans is most pronounced amongst high-tech industry firms 
at the upper end of the size distribution (Table 7). Secondly, state finance has uniformly 
positive effects in low-medium technology industries only (Table 5). Finally, informal 
financing channels do not appear to have any impact on the start-up size of the majority 
of firms entering in high-tech industries (Table 7). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Using a unique dataset that provides information on the financial structure of start-
up companies in the Chinese manufacturing industries, this paper documents robust 
evidence that access to formal financing channels has beneficial effects on firm size, these 
effects being more marked as we move up the entry size distribution. By contrast, we 
                                           
4 See Appendix A for details on the classification of technology intensity. 
  9find negative relationships between informal finance and entry size across all size 
quantiles. Given the well-documented positive correlations between firm size and 
numerous performance indicators (e.g. productivity, exporting and survival), this paper 
has therefore uncovered entry size as an additional channel through which financial 
development promotes growth. The finding has relevance to the vibrant literature on 
finance and growth, especially to the strand of the literature that seeks to document the 
distributional effects of financial development. 
Our work has also an important policy implication. Given the correlation between 
firm size and performance, the extent to which Chinese start-up companies will create 
longer lasting jobs as well as significantly contribute to aggregate  productivity growth is 
directly related to their access to the state-dominated banking system. In this sense, our 
paper has highlighted the potential benefits of more tightly coordinating the on-going 
reforms of the Chinese financial system with existing industrial development strategies. 
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Figure 1: Histograms of start-up size for 2000 and 2005




Start-up size effects of bank loans (Fig. 2a) and self-raised finance (Fig. 2b): 
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Table 1 
Frequency distribution of start-ups by year  
and technology intensity of industry 
 
 Technology  intensity   
Entry 
year 






2000  1,878  1,869  669  449 4,865 
2001  4,070  3,642  1,777  944 10,433 
2002  3,707  3,174  1,595  859 9,335 
2003  5,513  5,152  2,263  1,102 14,030 
2004  13,134  12,639  6,663  3,206 35,642 
2005  6,537  6,142  3,033  1,561 17,273 
Total 34,839  32,618  16,000  8,121 91,578 




Variable Definition  Mean    Standard 
deviation 
Entry size  Log of employment  4.413  1.006 
Bank loans  Bank loans at time of start-up 
divided by total asset 
0.112 0.314 
Foreign finance  The share of foreign finance in 
start-up firm’s equity 
0.144 0.330 
State finance  The share of state finance in start-
up firm’s equity 
0.024 0.142 
Self-raised finance  Self-raised finance at time of start-
up divided by total asset. 
0.782 0.389 
Minimum efficiency scale   Log of industry  median 
employment 
4.700 0.365 
Turbulence  Sum of industry entry and exit rates  0.204 0.060 
Industry growth  Industry sales growth   0.090  0.367 
FDI  Share foreign multinationals in sales 
in total industry sales 
0.001 0.007 
Herfindhal   Herfindhal measure of industry 
concentration calculated in terms of 
market shares. 
0.083 0.114 
Observations 91578     
 
  14Table 3: 
Finance and start-up size in China:  
Quantile regression estimates 
  Quantiles 
  10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th 
Bank loans  0.347*** 0.302***  0.307*** 0.335*** 0.410*** 
  (0.010) (0.016)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) 
Foreign finance  0.318*** 0.228***  0.282*** 0.330*** 0.367*** 
  (0.017) (0.028)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) 
State finance   0.477*** -1.685***  0.291*** 0.495*** 0.710*** 
  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.035) (0.032) (0.039) 
Informal finance  -0.086*** 0.001  -0.035  -0.085*** -0.129*** 
  (0.015) (0.025)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) 
Minimum efficient scale  0.808*** 0.660***  0.746*** 0.826*** 0.858*** 
  (0.009) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Turbulence   0.123* -0.019  0.057  0.142* 0.164* 
  (0.052) (0.083)  (0.069) (0.065) (0.079) 
Industry growth   0.032***  0.033*  0.034** 0.033** 0.035** 
  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
FDI  -3.033*** -10.405***  -6.184*** -2.277*** -1.465 
  (0.420) (0.438)  (0.431) (0.513) (0.799) 
Herfindhal index  0.051 -0.211***  -0.161***  0.044 0.291*** 
  (0.027) (0.042)  (0.036) (0.033) (0.040) 
Observations  91578  91578  91578  91578  91578 
 
Notes: 
a.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include time dummies. 
  15 
Table 4: 
Finance and start-up size in low-technology industries 
  Quantiles 
  10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th 
Bank loans  0.340*** 0.322*** 0.326*** 0.404*** 0.526*** 
  (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) 
Foreign finance  0.328*** 0.415*** 0.381*** 0.376*** 0.269*** 
  (0.046) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.056) 
State finance   -0.151*  0.163*** 0.301*** 0.468*** 0.550*** 
  (0.069) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.082) 
Informal finance  -0.064 -0.029 -0.123***  -0.153***  -0.244*** 
  (0.041) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.051) 
Minimum 
efficient scale 
0.724*** 0.788*** 0.845*** 0.861*** 0.881*** 
  (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) 
Turbulence   0.478*  0.223 0.180 0.290 0.723** 
  (0.210) (0.145) (0.159) (0.162) (0.247) 
Industry growth   0.100*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.085*** 0.150*** 
  (0.029) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.039) 
FDI  -5.324 -7.293**  -2.032 -6.614*  -5.160 
  (4.072) (2.769) (2.968) (3.150) (5.093) 
Herfindhal index  0.040  0.205**  0.377*** 0.708*** 1.049*** 
  (0.096) (0.063) (0.068) (0.066) (0.097) 
Observations  34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 
 
Notes: 
d.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
e.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
f.  All specifications include time dummies. 
  16Table 5: 
Finance and start-up size in low-medium technology industries 
 
  Quantiles 
  10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th 
Bank loans  0.231*** 0.275*** 0.318*** 0.379*** 0.490*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) 
Foreign finance  0.172*** 0.162*** 0.193*** 0.320*** 0.347*** 
  (0.041) (0.038) (0.031) (0.039) (0.051) 
State finance   0.391*** 0.407*** 0.573*** 0.787*** 0.931*** 
  (0.061) (0.057) (0.046) (0.057) (0.075) 
Informal finance  0.022  -0.054  -0.098*** -0.127*** -0.201*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) (0.043) 
Minimum 
efficient scale 
0.738*** 0.840*** 0.914*** 0.965*** 0.894*** 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) 
Turbulence   0.683*** 0.896*** 1.424*** 1.891*** 2.046*** 
  (0.195) (0.190) (0.154) (0.196) (0.255) 
Industry growth   0.067*** 0.052**  0.051*** 0.082*** 0.105*** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) 
FDI  -6.231*** -3.714*** -1.917*** -1.039  -0.726 
  (0.392) (0.458) (0.455) (0.715) (0.828) 
Herfindhal index  -0.274*** -0.224*** -0.012  0.262***  0.618*** 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.043) (0.054) (0.068) 
Observations   32618 32618 32618 32618 32618 
 
Notes: 
a.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include time dummies. 
  17Table 6: 
Finance and start-up size in medium-high technology industries 
 
  Quantiles 
  10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th 
Bank loans  0.296*** 0.217*** 0.089**  0.436*** 0.583*** 
  (0.037) (0.021) (0.032) (0.037) (0.051) 
Foreign finance  0.181** 1.095***  -0.067  0.371***  0.500*** 
  (0.061) (0.028) (0.053) (0.059) (0.082) 
State finance   -0.073  1.250*** 0.704*** 0.923*** 1.161*** 
  (0.100) (0.053) (0.085) (0.095) (0.126) 
Informal finance  -0.007  0.898*** 0.513*** -0.121*  -0.098 
  (0.055) (0.023) (0.047) (0.053) (0.074) 
Minimum efficient 
scale 
0.478*** 0.545*** 0.270*** 0.983*** 0.915*** 
  (0.062) (0.035) (0.051) (0.058) (0.079) 
Turbulence    1.473** 2.345***  -4.171***  2.514***  2.269*** 
  (0.459) (0.255) (0.366) (0.415) (0.575) 
Industry growth   0.002 -0.041  0.081*  0.054 0.016 








  (2.070) (1.341) (2.028) (2.323) (3.008) 
Herfindhal index  0.119 0.064 -0.332***  0.386***  0.565*** 
  (0.093) (0.056) (0.086) (0.098) (0.130) 




a.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include time dummies. 
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Finance and start-up size in high -technology industries 
 
  Quantiles 
  10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th 
Bank loans  0.415*** 0.419*** 0.413*** 0.487*** 0.626*** 
  (0.056) (0.037) (0.039) (0.044) (0.081) 
Foreign finance  0.274**  0.324*** 0.458*** 0.517*** 0.599*** 
  (0.096) (0.067) (0.067) (0.077) (0.128) 
State finance   -0.112  0.207*  0.333*** 0.688*** -1.411*** 
  (0.140) (0.094) (0.097) (0.111) (0.332) 
Informal finance  0.066  -0.040 -0.101 -0.151*  -0.264* 
  (0.091) (0.063) (0.063) (0.073) (0.122) 
Minimum efficient 
scale 
0.652*** 0.614*** 0.758*** 0.923*** 1.014*** 
  (0.077) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.105) 
Turbulence   0.936 0.581 0.509 1.210**  1.213 
  (0.534) (0.370) (0.394) (0.459) (0.818) 
Industry growth   0.012 0.010 0.012 -0.021  -0.066 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.034) 
FDI  -2.370 -1.604 3.544  14.733***  0.518 
  (2.101) (1.956) (2.389) (2.139) (4.699) 
Herfindhal index  -0.313** -0.158  0.034  0.284*  0.520** 
  (0.120) (0.088) (0.096) (0.111) (0.200) 





a.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in  parentheses 
b.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c.  All specifications include time dummies. 
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Appendix A:  
Classification of manufacturing industries by level of technology 
intensity. 
 
Level of technology intensity  NACE two digits code (Divisions)  
High-technology sectors  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
(30); Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus(32); 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks (33). 
Medium-high technology sectors  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. (31); Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers (34); Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products (24); Manufacture of 
machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29); Manufacture 
of other transport equipment (35) 
Medium-low technology sectors  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel (23); Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products  (25);  Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products  (26);  Manufacture  of 
basic metals (27);  Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment (28) 
Low technology sectors  Manufacture of food products and beverages (15);  
Manufacture of tobacco products (16); Manufacture 
of textiles (17); Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing of fur (18); Tanning and 
dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags,  harness and footwear (19);   
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials (20); Manufacture of 
pulp, paper and paper products (21); Publishing, 
printing and reproduction of recorded media (22);  
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36) 
 
Source: Eurostat-OECD classification of technology-intensive sectors. 
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